

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.378
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COLLECTION

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-EIGHTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday, 13 March 1968, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

(Canada)

GE.68-4321
68-07970

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J.A. de ARAUJO CASTRO
Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA
Mr. A. da COSTA GUIMARAES
Mr. O. MUNIZ OLIVA

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. CHRISTOV
Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG
U KYAW MIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. A.G. CAMPBELL
Mr. J.R. MORDEN
Mr. A. BERNIER

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. P. WINKLER
Mr. T. LAHODA
Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ZELLEKE
Mr. B. ASSFAW

India:

Mr. M.A. HUSAIN
Mr. K.P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. R. CARACCIOLI
Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI
Mr. E. FRANCO
Mr. R. BERLENGHI

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO
Mr. A. CARRANCO AVILA

Nigeria:

Alhaji SULE KOLO
Mr. B.O. TONWE

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. S. DABROWA

Romania:

Mr. N. ECOBESCO
Mr. O. IONESCO
Mr. C. GEORGESCO
Mr. A. COROIANU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL
Mr. A. EDELSTAM
Mr. M. STAHL
Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. O.A. GRINEVSKY
Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV
Mr. V.B. TOULINOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALLAF
Mr. O. SIRRY
Mr. M. SHAKER

United Kingdom:

Mr. I.F. PORTER
Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE

United States of America:

Mr. W.C. FOSTER
Mr. S. DePALMA
Mr. L.D. WEILER
Mr. C.G. BREAM

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

1. The CHAIRMAN (Canada): I declare open the 378th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

2. Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): I wish to comment today on the proposals and suggestions of various delegations which have not been incorporated in the revised draft treaty which was circulated at our last meeting (ENDC/224, Annex A).

3. Turning first to the important statement made by the representative of Nigeria at our meeting of 28 February, I must emphasize that we recognize the constructive spirit motivating his comments on that occasion. I can assure him that we have given careful attention to his proposals (ENDC/202; 220/Rev.1) for changes in the revised draft (ENDC/192/Rev.1, 193/Rev.1) and we appreciate his desire "to conserve the gains that have so far been made" (ENDC/PV.371, para.4). Ambassador Kolo questioned the wording of the first sentence of paragraph 2 of article IV of the revised drafts and suggested it be amended to provide a more definite undertaking to facilitate the exchange of scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of atomic energy (ibid., paras.10,11).

4. While it is true that the present sentence enunciates a right to participate in and not a commitment to facilitate the exchange, it should not be overlooked that the next sentence of the article does establish the obligation of the parties to co-operate in contributing to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. We note that this new article has been welcomed by other members of the Committee. As other delegations have stated, the obligation expressed in a provision of this nature must of necessity be a general one. I am convinced, however, that the formal commitment provided in the article will ensure the widespread development of peaceful applications of nuclear energy which Ambassador Kolo and all of us desire. We should also not forget in this connexion that a review of this aspect of the treaty will be possible at the review conferences.

5. The representative of Nigeria also asked whether we shared his view that the first sentence of paragraph 2 of article IV of the revised draft could be said to cover the exchange of information on the peaceful application of nuclear explosive devices (ibid., para.10). Mr. Chairman, my delegation does hold the view that this sentence of article IV of the revised draft covers the exchange of information on the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions. The United States is already committed

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to a policy of making available to other countries, as widely as possible, information concerning all aspects of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including information on the applications of nuclear explosions for peaceful uses. Article IV is in keeping with that long-standing United States policy and ensures that that policy will continue.

6. I might add that over 400 formal unclassified reports and articles have been published by United States authors on the subject of the application of peaceful nuclear explosions. Moreover, our continued publication of basic technical information on this subject permits other nations, including non-nuclear-weapon States, to make their own studies of specific peaceful applications.

7. In our view, the revised draft article IV also serves the purpose intended by Ambassador Kolo's proposed amendment to article V requiring annual reports to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on international co-operation in developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The present article IV establishes the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of information and also provides for co-operation with international organizations. These provisions are realistic, widely-acceptable means for ensuring the type of broad international exchanges desired. They should encourage and facilitate the circulation of such information reports through IAEA and other international organizations and at periodic international conferences on the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Making the reports compulsory for each party could prove unnecessarily burdensome to many, as well as to IAEA, especially in view of the expected acceleration and expansion of such co-operation and exchanges.

8. Ambassador Kolo stated that his proposed amendment to article V was also intended "to minimize the grounds for suspicion by parties to the treaty in respect of inter-State nuclear activities" (ENDC/PV.371, para.13), among which he cited peaceful nuclear explosion services under bilateral agreements. Mr. Chairman, my delegation believes that the prohibitions enunciated in articles I and II and the safeguards provisions in article III already constitute effective means for achieving that purpose. With regard to bilateral agreements under the present article V, we have already spoken on this matter at our meeting of 22 February (ENDC/PV.369, paras.37 et seq.)

9. An amendment was also suggested to article IV by the distinguished representative of Italy (ENDC/218). This is the proposal to add to article IV a sentence stating that nothing in the treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all parties to acquire source and special fissionable materials or equipment for the use of source and special fissionable materials for peaceful purposes.

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10. On a number of occasions this Committee has been most appropriately reminded by the delegation of Italy of the great importance of fissionable materials in the development of peaceful nuclear activities. Most recently, on 20 February the distinguished representative of Italy, Ambassador Caracciolo, explained how access to nuclear raw materials was indeed an important means of participating in the world of modern science and technology (ENDC/PV.367, paras.57 et seq.).

11. Earlier, on 1 August 1967, Mr. Fanfani, the distinguished Foreign Minister of Italy, made a proposal which included as one of its key elements the supply of fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon countries (ENDC/PV.318, paras.15 et seq.; ENDC/205). We believe that the stress which Italy has placed on the vital problem of nuclear supply has contributed to both a realistic and a far-sighted appreciation of one of the important features of our work.

12. Concerns such as those expressed by the delegation of Italy have contributed to the formulation of article IV and article III. The second paragraph of article IV now contains a clear-cut undertaking by parties to co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the future development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the treaty. This undertaking would include the supply of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes.

13. Some concern has been expressed in this Committee that perhaps in some way the requirement of safeguards pursuant to article III might detract from international co-operation in the supply of nuclear materials. However, it is important to note that the first sentence of the third paragraph of article III states clearly that the safeguards required by the article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of the treaty. Moreover, paragraph 3 of article III prescribes that the safeguards shall avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment -- and I repeat: including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment.

14. Mr. Chairman, in view of these two provisions, paragraph 3 of article III and paragraph 2 of article IV, we believe that the essential purpose of the Italian amendment to article IV, as we understand it, is achieved already in the draft non-proliferation treaty. That is why we do not believe that additional language is required.

15. With regard to article IX, the distinguished representative of Nigeria suggested (ENDC/PV.371, para.24) that a number of non-nuclear-weapon States equivalent to a majority of the membership of the United Nations be required to ratify the treaty before

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it enters into force. On this point I can only reiterate our conviction that requiring so large a number could create a risk of further proliferation by delaying the treaty's entry into force, possibly by as much as two years after it was opened for signature. Naturally, the treaty's entry into force marks only a firm starting-point; over the long run we would hope for adherence to the treaty not only by a majority of the Membership of the United Nations but by virtually every nation.

16. The changes regarding periodic review of the treaty included in the revised draft have a bearing on other parts of the treaty to which other suggestions were addressed. In particular, they have a bearing on the provisions in article X for duration. No changes have been made in these provisions, in part because we believe that the present provisions already reflect a realistic compromise between divergent viewpoints. A number of countries have expressed a preference for indefinite duration, but have indicated their willingness to accept the provision for a twenty-five-year initial duration period in order to make the treaty more widely acceptable.

17. We have not felt it advisable to add the further amendment suggested by the representative of Italy, which would give parties a right to denounce the treaty at the end of twenty-five years without stating any reason therefor. But the provision for periodic review now included in the text does, we believe, encompass the essential element of flexibility which we understand was also in part the aim of the Italian delegation's proposal for amending the duration clause. In this connexion we do not see any need to specify, as suggested by the representative of Nigeria (ENDC/PV.371, paras.18,19; ENDC/220/Rev.1), that findings of review conferences should be adopted by a majority of signatories. There should be no difficulty for a majority of signatories, or for that matter any group of parties, making known at a review conference any collective views they may have.

18. Flexibility also appeared to be the motivation of the representative of Nigeria when he questioned the wording of the first sentence of article X and expressed concern that it might fetter the sovereign rights of States (ENDC/PV.371, para.21). We sincerely believe this concern is unfounded. I would only point out that the sentence is derived entirely from the Limited Test Ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1). That is to say, the formulation used already enjoys wide international acceptance.

19. At our 376th meeting the distinguished representative of Romania, Ambassador Ecobesco, presented several amendments (ENDC/223/Rev.1) to the draft Non-Proliferation Treaty texts of 18 January, then before the Conference. We have reviewed these amendments, together with Ambassador Ecobesco's explanation of their purpose. I should first like to note that several of these proposed amendments were previously presented in the working paper

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offered to the Conference by the Romanian delegation on 19 October 1967 (ENDC/199) and have been thoroughly discussed in this Committee. Several of the Romanian suggestions in that earlier document were reflected in the draft text of 18 January. Also, the Romanian amendment relating to periodic review (ENDC/223/Rev.1, p.4), presented at our meeting of 11 March (ENDC/PV.376, para.22), was reflected in the revised draft treaty presented later in that same meeting (ENDC/224, Annex A).

20. With regard to the proposed Romanian amendments to article III, the substance of most of those amendments was discussed in Ambassador DePalma's statement of our 368th meeting, in reply to Ambassador Ecobesco's questions at our 362nd meeting. For example, the proposed new paragraph 6 of article III, calling for Security Council control to -- "... ensure that non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on whose territory there are foreign military bases shall not acquire in any form whatsoever access to nuclear weapons indirectly through such bases" --

parallels the substance of one of Ambassador Ecobesco's earlier questions. In this instance I should like to reiterate the response given by the United States delegation to his earlier question:

"The answer is to be found in the provisions of article I which prohibit any transfer to any recipient whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or devices, directly or indirectly. This article and the counterpart article II thus prohibit those activities which constitute nuclear proliferation. The treaty is not designed to deal with defence relationships or arrangements within alliances which do not involve nuclear proliferation. Any attempt to do so would take us back into the morass of theoretical argumentation over amorphous issues which too long frustrated our negotiations." (ENDC/PV.368, para.30)

21. Similarly, we have previously treated the question of the degree to which peaceful nuclear activities of non-nuclear-weapon parties must be subject to treaty safeguards. We have already noted that the IAEA safeguards document (INFCIRC/66/Rev.1) -- particularly in paragraphs 47 and 58 -- already provides for varying degrees of inspection. Also we have pointed out that there are provisions -- specifically in paragraphs 21 and 22 -- for exempting from safeguards any total quantities of source or special fissionable materials which are too small to be potentially significant from the standpoint of nuclear proliferation. Therefore I believe that the proposed Romanian amendments dealing with quantitative and qualitative limitations on the application of treaty safeguards are unnecessary. They are already covered in principle and as far as necessary in the IAEA safeguards document.

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22. However, I should like to reiterate our conviction that, to accomplish the exclusive purpose stated in the first sentence of article III, treaty safeguards must in the first instance be applicable to all source or special fissionable material in the peaceful nuclear activities of non-nuclear-weapon parties. Any exemptions from such safeguards and relaxations in the degree of safeguards inspection would then be made as provided for in the safeguards agreements concluded with IAEA and in accordance with specific provisions of the IAEA safeguards document, such as those I mentioned earlier.

23. Finally, Mr. Chairman, we have given careful study to the important statement of the representative of India made at our 370th meeting. I believe it is fair to say that the burden of his criticism of the draft treaty now before us is that it is not a full-fledged measure of nuclear disarmament.

24. The United States fully appreciates the consistently-expressed view of the delegation of India that the non-proliferation treaty not only should set the stage for actual measures of nuclear disarmament, but should itself embody such measures, or at least a specific undertaking regarding various measures. Nothing would please us more than to be able to draft and support such a treaty. The Committee is aware of the various measures the United States has proposed to halt the nuclear arms race and of its earnest desire to initiate a discussion leading to limitations and subsequent reductions of existing nuclear arsenals.

25. However, what any one of our countries may desire can only be a prelude to and a goal for negotiations. If any of us adopted the view that our desires must be fully satisfied before we could agree on any forward step, there would be no point in negotiation. The draft treaty in its latest revised form represents the maximum area of agreement now obtainable; but, more important, it constitutes what we are convinced is an essential and effective measure which must be taken now if we are to have a fair chance to make the further progress we all want.

26. That is why we believe that those who continue to have reservations about what they may feel to be the limited scope of this treaty should consider carefully the implications of their position. This is particularly true in the case of those delegations whose governments have over the years consistently urged the need to halt the nuclear arms race and to reduce nuclear arsenals. Such governments would,

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we believe, assume a heavy responsibility if they were now to withhold their support from this treaty -- which is a major step -- only because it does not go as far as they had wished. Progress in arms control and disarmament will always be difficult and, if it is to be realized, it will require the co-operation and encouragement of all nations which sincerely share this objective.

27. The CHAIRMAN (Canada): I should now like to address the Committee in my capacity as representative of Canada.
28. The Canadian delegation welcomes the latest revisions included in the draft non-proliferation treaty which was submitted on Monday, 11 March (ENDC/224, Annex A). These revisions constitute a further step in the elaboration of a treaty which should be both effective and widely acceptable. Anyone who has followed the course of negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament during the past two years and studied the successive draft treaty texts should be convinced of the constructive results obtained through the efforts of all delegations.
29. We shall very soon be moving on to the United Nations General Assembly for what will probably be the last round of negotiations, in which the treaty will take on its final form. The Canadian delegation would respectfully suggest that all members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament have a responsibility to do all in their power to make the General Assembly debate as constructive, relevant and informed as possible. Members of the United Nations not represented in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament will have a great deal of material to assimilate in the short time between the sending of our report and the opening of the resumed session.
30. Therefore we subscribe to the principle of the working paper (ENDC/221) submitted by the delegation of Italy, which is finding its place in Annex E, or perhaps some other annex, of the proposed report to the General Assembly. The co-Chairmen suggested at our meeting of Monday last that delegations should select for listing in that annex statements of their positions on the treaty or proposals they have made which they consider should be brought to the attention of other Members of the United Nations (ENDC/PV.376, para.49). The Canadian delegation has taken action as suggested.
31. The Canadian Government is in general agreement with the provisions of the treaty in its latest revision and welcomes the last changes which have been incorporated.

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32. We find the content and phrasing of the preamble satisfactory, and in particular we ascribe importance to the provisions that assert support for research on and development of the instrumented means of carrying out safeguards procedures in the system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); to the provisions that affirm the principle that States not possessing nuclear weapons should receive the benefits of all peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including the uses of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes; and to those provisions which refer to steps to halt the arms race and lead to nuclear disarmament. We are pleased to see the inclusion in the present draft of the paragraph suggested by the delegation of Sweden (ENDC/215) reaffirming the determination expressed in the Moscow limited test-ban treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) to achieve a cessation of all nuclear weapon testing.

33. As I have mentioned in earlier statements, Canada finds that articles I and II of the treaty, often referred to as its core, adequately provide for preventing States other than the existing nuclear Powers from acquiring nuclear weapons. That, of course, is the main purpose of the treaty. In that connexion we have welcomed the recent assurances by the co-Chairmen, in response to points raised by some delegations, that they consider articles I and II to contain no loop-holes to proliferation of practical significance.

34. Turning to article III: while Canada would have preferred an equitable safeguards article, which would apply safeguards to the peaceful nuclear activities of all parties to the treaty, we consider the formulation of article III submitted on 18 January by the United States and the Soviet Union (ENDC/192/Rev.1; 193/Rev.1) to be an acceptable compromise arising out of lengthy and difficult negotiations. As a non-nuclear-weapon State, Canada has been greatly assisted in coming to a decision to support this formulation by the public undertakings of the United States and the United Kingdom last December to accept safeguards on their own non-military nuclear activities (ENDC/206,207). We earnestly appeal to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to give a similar undertaking.

35. We would urge other members of this Committee also to support the latest formulation of article III. This article is in our view essential to the credibility and working of the treaty, because it would provide effective means of ensuring that the terms of the treaty were being respected by the parties. As we have often

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stated in this Committee, Canada considers provision for effective verification to be fundamental to realistic and durable measures of arms control, not least to invest them with the vital element of international credibility. Article III would, we are sure, accord the treaty the necessary credibility and instil in parties the confidence necessary to ensure that the treaty would be effective in preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons and enhancing the security of the community of nations.

36. We would remind members of the Committee that the intent of the article is to apply safeguards in accordance with the Statute of IAEA and the Agency's safeguards system (INFCIRC/66/Rev.1). This safeguards system has been sanctioned by the General Conference of the Agency, which claims the membership of every country represented in this Committee. It has, moreover, attracted wide international support and has stood the test of time and experience. Article III envisages, not the imposition of a new untried concept and set of procedures, not a departure from established norms and practices, but rather the logical, and we trust progressive, extension of an effective, unobtrusive and generally-acceptable set of controls against the diversion of nuclear energy to weapon purposes.

37. What is required at this juncture is merely some general indication of support for the principle and intent of the article, particularly from those members of the Committee with active peaceful nuclear programmes. No member can be expected to make a final judgement on or commitment to the article until the treaty is in final form. All members will have the opportunity to review and assess the viability of all provisions of the treaty before they sign and ratify it. Even as parties, they will have the opportunity to review the actual functioning of the treaty and the extent to which all parties are living up to its terms and spirit.

38. However, we can clearly not begin the process of developing a treaty safeguards system until a convincing number of prospective parties agree on and indicate their support for such a system. Only with such support can we ensure that the predominant part of the world's nuclear materials and equipment will fall under effective safeguards.

39. There has been much discussion in this Committee of the need for the treaty to provide for an acceptable balance of mutual obligations between the nuclear and non-nuclear States. In the view of the Canadian delegation, article IV of the treaty goes some way towards establishing such a balance, as it expresses an

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obligation upon States with advanced nuclear programmes to assist those in less favoured circumstances. Furthermore, my delegation considers it most important that article IV guarantees the rights of parties to the treaty to the unrestricted development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and to the co-operation to that end of other States and international organizations.

40. Article V of the treaty deals with a subject which has at times provoked a lively debate in the Committee. I refer, of course, to the use of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes. We support the wording of the present article V, which, we feel, contains advantages for non-nuclear countries which offset the prohibitions contained in articles I and II. During our debate I have many times stated Canada's position on the regulation of peaceful nuclear explosions under a treaty of non-proliferation. For the present I shall merely repeat what I said at our meeting on 21 February, which reflects our desire to see the elaboration of an effective non-proliferation treaty without any loop-holes:

"... we support the prohibitive provision in articles I and II; and the fundamental reason for this is that we believe that military and civil nuclear explosive technologies are indistinguishable. The ability to produce any kind of nuclear explosive device is the same as the ability to produce a nuclear weapon ..." (ENDC/PV.368, para.3)

41. Canada considers that the provisions of article V are particularly advantageous, as they assure States without nuclear weapons that they will be able to secure nuclear explosive services for peaceful purposes when these have been developed by the nuclear Powers, but without any charges for research and development. Such arrangements would spare non-nuclear-weapon States the high costs in both financial and human terms and the delays of many years which would be involved in developing nuclear explosive devices with their own resources.

42. My delegation, among others, has raised questions concerning the provision for bilateral arrangements for peaceful nuclear explosive services. We have welcomed the oral assurances on this point which have been given by the co-Chairmen, particularly that bilateral arrangements would be arrived at and implemented in strict accordance with articles I and II of the treaty. As stated by the representative of the United States, any bilateral arrangements would be subject to international observation.

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43. We have noted also statements by the co-Chairmen that it will be necessary in due course, when more is known about the economic and technical feasibility of employing nuclear explosions for engineering or other developmental purposes, to draw up a convention or international agreement on the modes of carrying out and controlling the arrangements foreseen under the provisions of article V. The Canadian delegation suggested an outline of what such a convention should contain in its intervention on 12 September 1967 (ENDC/PV.329, paras. 19 et seq.).

44. Canada is in agreement with the provisions of article VIII, as now revised. We welcome the inclusion of language which makes possible periodic review of how the objects of both the treaty and the preamble are being achieved.

45. With regard to article IX, as we have said before, we consider that forty ratifications are about the number which should be required to bring the treaty into force. In view of the importance of this treaty, the Canadian Government hopes that it will come into effect with the minimum of delay.

46. The provisions of article X are completely acceptable to my delegation.

47. Turning now from the treaty itself, I should like to comment briefly on an equally important and closely-related subject. We have from time to time voiced concern that the question of security assurances has not yet been dealt with in our Committee's negotiations. We have, of course, appreciated the complexities and the difficulties of reaching an agreement of this kind. Therefore, we greatly welcome the recent tripartite agreement on this issue. We have long been convinced that the non-aligned non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the treaty have a legitimate claim to be protected against nuclear intimidation and attack, in return for their renunciation of the right to acquire nuclear weapons.

48. The Canadian Government believes that the agreement between the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, as expressed in statements by the representatives of those Powers at our 375th meeting (ENDC/222), advances very considerably the possibilities of general acceptance of the non-proliferation treaty -- which it regards as so fundamentally necessary at this time. The proposed resolution and accompanying declarations, furthermore, would constitute an obligation of the nuclear Powers, thus giving further recognition to the principle that there should be an appropriate balance of mutual obligations and responsibilities in and relating to a non-proliferation treaty.

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49. In conclusion, I would say that it appears to the Canadian delegation that the draft treaty now before us approaches the optimum reconciliation of the varying interests and concerns of the nations in the world today in regard to this problem. The governments we represent must take their decisions in the light of the dangers and tensions of the present and, more importantly, in the light of the greater tensions and dangers which will certainly develop if they do nothing to check the spread of nuclear weapons and, following that, to halt the nuclear arms race.

50. Mr. PORTER (United Kingdom): I too should like to say a few words on the draft treaty text presented by the co-Chairmen on 11 March (ENDC/224, Annex A).

51. We assume that, before the final text is opened for signature, work will have to be done to make the various language versions conform. That should provide an opportunity to polish the drafting of certain passages -- I am thinking in particular of those to which I referred at our 369th meeting -- in order to ensure clarity and precision in all languages.

52. However, today my delegation is concerned with the substance of the text, and I should like merely to make one point on that. We have said on many occasions -- the most recent being on 23 January, when my Minister addressed the Committee (ENDC/PV.358, para. 23) -- that we want a treaty which will last, and that without some progress on future measures of disarmament, in our view, the treaty would not last. It was with that in mind that we proposed our amendment to article VIII (ENDC/203/Rev.1); and I am glad to see that the co-Chairmen have accepted it and the Swedish amendments of 8 February (ENDC/215) and have incorporated them in the revised text.

53. We are satisfied that the treaty as now drafted will maintain the momentum for progress in disarmament; and we hope that it will meet the similar preoccupation of other countries both within and outside the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

54. I should like to thank the representatives of the United States and the USSR for all the work and devotion which has gone into the text now before us, a text which is satisfactory from our point of view.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 378th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador E.L.M. Burns, representative of Canada.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 14 March 1968, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.30 a.m.